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I. INTRODUCTION
One issue that is consistently at the forefront of political debate
in America is the educational system.1 The debate over education
involves funding, accountability, and curriculum issues, among others.

1. See, e.g., Allec Gallup, Education:A Vital Issue in Election 2000, Poll Analyses, Oct. 2,
2000 (stating that "the public ranks education as one of the most important issues in this year's
presidential campaign, with ninety-one percent saying it is 'very' or 'extremely' important").
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One education issue that does not receive as much attention as some
of the more politically charged issues is special education.
The goal of the American public school system is to educate all
children, but how should that goal be implemented with regard to
learning-disabled children? How does the educational system meet the
individualized needs of disabled students while ensuring that these
students are not isolated from the rest of the student body? Congress
attempted to address these problems with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA" of "the Act"). 2 The Act sought to
promote mainstreaming3 by promising augmented education funding
4
to states that increased mainstreaming in their school systems.
Over the years the court system has had the unenviable task of
interpreting Congress' intent in enacting the IDEA. This task is made
more difficult because the Act itself has conflicting mandates 5 and
because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance. 6 As discussed
below, 7 the courts' main problem has been trying to reconcile the Act's
mandate that all students receive an individualized and appropriate
education 8 with its emphasis on mainstreaming those students with
special needs to the greatest extent possible. 9
Thus far, the task of interpreting the Act and reconciling its
conflicting mandates has fallen to the courts of appeals. The courts
that have attempted to reconcile the Act's conflicting mandates have
utilized at least four different methodological approaches,1 0 leaving
2.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2000).
3.
The terms mainstreaming and inclusion, though commonly used interchangeably, do
not embody the same concepts. Mainstreaming includes the concept that "a student must 'earn'

his or her opportunity to" attend the regular classroom by demonstrating "the ability to 'keep up'
with the work assigned." Joy Rogers, The Inclusion Revolution, Phi Delta Kappa Research
Bulletin 11 (May 1993), availableat http://www.pdkintl.org/edres/resbulll.htm. Inclusion, on the
other hand, deals with "bringing the support services to the child ... and requires only that the
child will benefit from being in the class." Id. Likewise, the Third Circuit has pointed out that
inclusion has a "greater emphasis on the use of supplementary aids and support services" in the
regular classroom. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third
Circuit described mainstreaming as "[i]ntegrating children with disabilities in regular
classrooms." Id. Though inclusion is a more correct term when discussing the IDEA because of its
focus on supplementary services, this Note will employ the term mainstreaming because "it is
currently the common parlance." Id.
4. See § 1411(a)(1) ("The Secretary shall make grants to States and the outlying areas, and
provide funds to the Secretary of the Interior, to assist them to provide special education and
related services to children with disabilities in accordance with this part.").
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. The only Supreme Court case in this area is Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982),
and its usefulness is limited. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See generally § 1412(a)(1).
9. See generally id. § 1412(a)(5).
10. See infra Part II.B.
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the status of the law unclear.1 1 This Note will attempt to evaluate the
different tests that circuit courts have devised by focusing on how well
they each reflect the concerns of the parties affected by the
mainstreaming decisionmaking process. Part II describes the
background and origins of the problem beginning with the
constitutional principles underlying the IDEA. This part will then
trace the development of the issue through the passage of the IDEA.
In Part III, this Note examines the scant Supreme Court
jurisprudence dealing with the Act. Part III then explores the various
methods that the circuit courts have employed while attempting to
balance the conflicting provisions of the IDEA as well as the
implications that result from each of these approaches. In Part IV,
this Note analyzes the various approaches by examining the interests
reflected in each. The discussion will focus on the interests of school
systems, classroom teachers, non-learning-disabled students, the court
system, and finally, disabled students. While much has been written
on mainstreaming and on courts' approaches to the topic, the practical
effects of the different approaches on these groups have not always
been addressed. This Note will attempt to shed more light on these
practical issues. Finally, this Note will conclude with a call for the
adoption of a four-factor balancing test proposed by the Ninth Circuit
and recommend congressional clarification.
In order to place the various issues in context, this Note will
use the case of Beth B. v. Van Clay1 2 to illustrate the challenges facing
courts that are involved in the mainstreaming inquiry. The case
concerns the plaintiff-student Beth B., a thirteen-year-old girl who
13
suffers from a neurodevelopmental disorder called Rett syndrome.
This disorder causes Beth to suffer from serious "disabilities to motor
functioning, communication and cognition."1 4 Grounding discussion
throughout this Note in the facts of the Beth B. case will clarify the
issues involved and the options available to the courts.

11. See Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least
Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals With Disabilities
EducationAct, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 275 (1994) (noting that there is confusion in the law
and stating that "[u]ntil the courts become consistent, either by action from the United States
Supreme Court or by the evolution of the law at the appellate court level, IDEA will continue to
guarantee different rights for children in different parts of the country").
12. No. 00-C-4771, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001).
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id.

1630

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1627

II. BACKGROUND
The IDEA is the necessary starting point for any inquiry into
mainstreaming methodology. This section will describe how the Act
was created in response to court decisions interpreting Brown v.
Board of Education15 and how the Act applies that decision's lessons to
the issue of special education in segregated classrooms. A discussion of
the Act, its history, and its provisions will follow.
A. ConstitutionalFoundations
The IDEA and its "[c]onstitutional theories of equal
educational opportunity for children with disabilities are rooted.., in
Brown v. Board of Education."16 In Brown, the Supreme Court
determined that "where the state has undertaken to provide
[education, it] must be made available to all on equal terms."17 The
Court rested this determination on the finding that education is of
utmost importance for the success of the child and the continued good
of society.18 Additionally, the Court found that segregating AfricanAmerican children into separate classrooms created "feeling[s] of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 19 The Court
felt that this de jure segregation harmed the segregrated child's
development and prevented the child from receiving benefits that he
20
or she would receive in an integrated classroom.
In the 1970s, advocates for mentally disabled students latched
onto this language and began to challenge the exclusion of mentally
disabled children from regular classrooms. They used the holding and
rationale of Brown as the basis for arguing that mentally disabled
students were being impermissibly excluded from the regular
21
education process.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 606 (1995).
17. 347 U.S. at 493.
18. The Court stated that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education" and that "[c]ompulsory school
attendance laws" and "great expenditures for education... demonstrate ... the importance of
education to our democratic society." Id.
19. Id. at 494.
20. The Court stated that "[s]egregation with the sanction of law... has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." Id.
21. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 'F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972) (analyzing the
plaintiffs claims under the Brown rationale).
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The first important case dealing with the constitutionality of
segregating mentally disabled students in the educational system was
22
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania ("PARC").
The PARC case was brought by thirteen children and PARC "on behalf
of all mentally retarded" children who were being excluded by the
Pennsylvania educational system.2 3 Drawing heavily from the
language and rationale of Brown, the plaintiffs alleged that certain
Pennsylvania statutes effectively prevented mentally disabled
children from attending public schools and thus violated the children's
due process rights. 24 The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes lacked
"any provision for notice and a hearing before" exclusion, and they
"arbitrarily and capriciously den[ied]" mentally disabled students the
right to an education. 25 The plaintiffs also alleged that the statutes
violated equal protection principles because they "assume[d] that
certain retarded children are uneducable and untrainable," and that
this assumption "lack[ed] a rational basis in fact." 26 The court
determined that it had jurisdiction to approve a consent agreement
because it found that the plaintiffs had made proper due process and
27
equal protection claims.
Soon after the PARC case, the district court in Mills v. Board of
Education held that excluding mentally disabled children from public
education violates their due process rights. 28 The Mills case concerned
seven children who sought to enjoin the District of Columbia school
district from excluding them from the school system because of their
mental disabilities. 29 Citing Brown, the court held that the school
district had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by not offering an education to plaintiffs while providing "such
education to other children."30 The court further held that suspending
and expelling these students "without any prior hearing" and without
"periodic review thereafter" violated the Due Process Clause. 3 1 The
court held that these violations entitled the plaintiffs to summary
judgment and ordered the school district to "provide to each child of

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295-96.
348 F. Supp. 866, 876-83 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 875.
Id.
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school age a free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless
32
of the degree of the child's ... impairment."
The importance of the Mills and PARC cases for the
development of mainstreaming cannot be understated. By applying
the basic Brown framework to mentally disabled children, the courts
opened the door for challenges to the practice of segregating and
excluding mentally disabled children from the regular educational
environment. The cages caught the attention of the public33 and,
34
eventually, the attention of the public's representatives in Congress.
Although it is unclear exactly how willing the Supreme Court would
be to apply this reasoning to disabled students, 35 the impact of these
36
cases led directly to the development of the IDEA.
B. Legislative Reaction: The IDEA is Born
Congress passed the forerunner of the IDEA, the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, in 197537 with the goal of assuring "all
38
children with disabilities ... a free appropriate public education."
The early cases dealing with education for special-needs students were
clearly a major factor in the development of the IDEA. 39 Congress,
"drawing on the principles articulated in PARC," created a statutory
scheme that mandated mainstreaming 40 in the "least restrictive

32. Id. at 875, 878.
33. According to one author, the cases "spawned substantial popular and scholarly
attention and similar lawsuits in more than thirty states." MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL
POLICY AND THE LAW 719 (1992).
34. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
35. There is some uncertainty as to how the Supreme Court would apply Fourteenth
Amendment analysis to disabled children today. The Court's holding in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center casts doubt on the reach of the PARC and Mills cases, because in
Cleburne the Court held that mentally retarded persons are not a suspect, or even a quasisuspect, class. 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1984). Although the Court's holding in Cleburne arguably
limits the force of the PARC and Mills cases, the importance of these decisions remains evident
in their influence on Congress. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000)).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000).
39. See Melvin, supra note 16, at 615 (stating that the "legislative history of the IDEA
makes clear that the Act was intended to address the equal protection and due process concerns
raised in the early 'right to education cases' "); see also Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the
Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion,"72 WASH. L. REV. 775, 791 (1997) (concluding that
"the PARC and Mills opinions were forces behind the initial passage of the IDEA in 1975").
40. Melvin, supra note 16, at 617 (stating that "Congress viewed the 'mainstreaming'
mandate as a central component of the Act").
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environment." 41 Following the decisions in PARC and Mills, Congress
believed that the IDEA was a necessary constitutional measure to aid
disabled school children 42 and that it "incorporated the major
43
principles of the right to education cases."
Congress based the statute on its finding that "the special
educational needs of children with disabilities were not being fully
met."44 The IDEA attempts to meet these needs by requiring states to
implement certain substantive provisions. Under the IDEA, if states
successfully implement the necessary provisions of the Act, the federal
45
government will provide special education money to the states.
of the
Under the Act, states are entitled to receive "[forty] percent
46
average per-pupil expenditure" from the federal government.
The two main substantive requirements of the IDEA are the
"free appropriate public education" ("FAPE")47 and the "least
restrictive environment" ("LRE") provisions. 48 These two key
provisions are the basis for most mainstreaming difficulties. In
addition to these two substantive requirements, the Act contains
procedural safeguards to protect special-needs children and their
49
parents.
One of the most significant portions of the IDEA is the Act's
"free appropriate public education" requirement. The Act requires that
states provide a FAPE "to all children with disabilities residing in the
State between the ages of [three] and [twenty-one], inclusive,
including children with disabilities who have been suspended or
expelled from school." 50 The language of the FAPE requirement does
not provide detailed guidelines as to how to measure an "appropriate"
education. Providing a free education seems intuitive, but what
exactly rises to the level of an appropriate education under the IDEA?

41.

Dupre, supra note 39, at 792 (discussing Congress's reliance on PARC and pointing to
that reliance as the way in which the "concept of education in the least restrictive environment
was ...

incorporated into IDEA").

42. Melvin, supra note 16, at 616 ("The legislative history evinces Congress's view that
desegregating children with disabilities is a matter of constitutional dimension.").
43. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A) (2000).
45. § 1412(1).
46. § 1411(a)(2)(B). Interestingly, there is some information that suggests that the federal
government provides only nine percent of the funding for special education. Leslie A. Collins &

Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost be a Factor in Special Education Cases?, 71
EDUC. L. REP. 11, 11 (1992).
47. § 1412(a)(1).
48. § 1412(a)(5).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70.

50.

§ 1412(a)(1)(A).
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The Supreme Court has provided some guidance, 51 but the issue is
52
still unclear.
The second significant provision of the IDEA, the least
restrictive environment provision, 53 conflicts with the FAPE
requirement and results in the problems at the heart of the Beth B. v.
Van Clay case. 54 As with the FAPE provision, the basic language of
the LRE provision appears straightforward. The statute provides that,
"to the maximum extent appropriate," disabled children should be
"educated with children who are not disabled."5 5 Further, the
provision requires disabled children should only be removed "when the
nature or severity of the disability ... is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily. '56 Though seemingly clear, "there
has been deep confusion over what is meant by the term 'least
restrictive environment' " since the beginning of federal legislation on
the subject.57 The LRE requirement 'was not intended to require an
either-or approach to integrating special-needs students into the
normal classroom; rather, the LRE decision is to be made "from a
'continuum' of placement options." 58 Again, however, the problem is
reconciling the need to provide a free appropriate education with the
need to ensure maximum exposure to the regular classroom
environment. A related question is whether and to what extent the
LRE provision of the IDEA should be subordinated to the FAPE
provision. Both of these issues have been solved in different ways by
the courts that have reviewed them. 59
In addition to the FAPE and LRE requirements, the IDEA
contains several other significant provisions. The first of these is the
"individualized educational program" ("IEP") provision. 60 The IEP is
51. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,(1982); see infra Part II.A.
52. See infra Part II.B.
53. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
54. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094, at *17 (stating that the "IDEA's twin goals, tailoring each
child's placement to her special needs and maximizing integration with non-disabled students,
are frequently difficult to reconcile, and the statute itself provides little guidance").
55. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
56. Id.
57. Jean B. Crockett, Special Education: The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997
IDEA Amendments and FederalRegulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 554 (1999).
58. Goldman, supra note 11, at 261; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a)-(b) (2001) (requiring a
"continuum of alternative placements" composed of "instruction in regular classes, special
classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions" in
addition to "provision [of] supplementary services ... to be provided in conjunction with regular
class placement").
59. See infra Part II.B.
60. § 1414(d).
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the manner in which a school system evaluates a child and then
makes a placement decision under the IDEA. The IEP is "a written
statement"6 1 composed of, among other things:
statement[s] of the child's present levels of educational performance,... measurable
annual goals .... special education and related services and supplementary aids and
services to be provided to the child... [including] a statement of the program
modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child,...
how the child's progress toward the annual goals.., will be measured; and how the
62
child's parents will be regularly informed.

The IEP is written in a collaborative way with a team including
the parents of the child, regular and special education teachers, a
school system representative, the child when appropriate, and other
individuals if needed. 63 By including a wide variety of individuals and
by requiring a clear statement of needs and goals, the IEP provision
ensures that input from a wide variety of different parties will focus
the placement decision on the individual needs of the student.
Another important provision in the Act is its set of procedural
safeguards. The Act grants parents the right to examine
any and all
64
documents and records regarding their child. In addition, parents
have the right to be notified if the school system either proposes or
refuses to grant a placement change. 65 Parents are also allowed to
66
make complaints to the school system regarding placement choices.
If the parents feel those complaints are not dealt with adequately,
67
they have the right to an impartial due process hearing.
Furthermore, parents may appeal an adverse hearing decision to the
state education agency. 68 Finally, the Act gives parents the right to
bring suit in state or federal court if they are still dissatisfied with the
placement decision. 69 If parents are successful in either state or
federal court, the Act authorizes the court to award them the
70
attorneys' fees incurred through the process.
The Beth B. case is a useful illustration of the IDEA's
provisions in action. Beth began her school career in a regular
kindergarten class. 71 An IEP was conducted annually to evaluate
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A).
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)-(viii).
§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii).
§ 1415(b)(1).
§ 1415(b)(3).
§ 1415(b)(6).
§ 1415(f).
§ 1415(g),
§ 1415(i)(2).
§ 1415(i)(3).
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001).
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Beth's performance. 72 After her second-grade year, the school system
suggested that Beth be moved from the regular classes that she had
been attending to a segregated environment. 7 Beth's parents
disagreed with the school system and exercised their right to an
impartial due process hearing under the IDEA. 74 At the hearing, the
impartial hearing officer found for the school system. 75 Beth's parents
then brought suit in federal court, in accordance with their rights
76
under the IDEA.
The IDEA's administrative remedies having been exhausted,
the issue was presented for judicial determination. The District Court
for the Eastern District of Illinois had only one Supreme Court case to
rely upon for precedent, 77 and that case dealt exclusively with the
FAPE provision. 78 The circuit courts' disparate approaches rounded
out what little the court had in the way of guidance. 79
The court in Beth B. was thus faced with the question of how to
reconcile the FAPE requirement with the LRE requirement.
Reviewing courts must decide the proper relationship between these
two provisions, and in doing so, they will have to decide which factors
and interests should be considered, and how much weight these
factors should be given. Most significantly, however, courts are
charged with ensuring the best possible educational outcome for a
disabled student-a task which may well be beyond the expertise of
the judicial system. This Note will next examine the options the
district court considered in Beth B. These approaches attempt, in
different ways, to resolve the conflict created by the FAPE and LRE
provisions of the IDEA.
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS
Where the administrative proceedings provided for by the
IDEA end, the job of the court system begins. This section examines
the various judicial reactions to the IDEA and reveals the conflict that
exists between its provisions. The discussion will begin with the
decision in Rowley, the only Supreme Court case interpreting any
relevant part of the IDEA. Ultimately the Rowley decision is more

72.
73.

Beth B., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094, at *3.
Id.

74.

Id. at *4.

75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); see also infra Part II.A.

78.
79.

See id. at 187-205.
See infra Part II.B.
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important for its influence on the circuit courts than for any
substantive doctrine. Accordingly, the discussion will progress to an
examination of the circuit courts' attempts to balance the IDEA's
provisions.
A. Supreme Court
The only Supreme Court case interpreting the IDEA's
provisions is Board of Education v. Rowley.80 The Rowley case dealt
with a deaf first-grade student who was denied a qualified signlanguage interpreter in her IEP.8 1 The student was performing "better
than the average child" in her class but was understanding
"considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were
not deaf. '8 2 The parents brought suit in accordance with the Act.8 3 The
case presented the courts with an opportunity to determine the
meaning of the term "free appropriate public education" and the
proper role of the court in reviewing cases under the IDEA.8 4 The
district court determined that the student was not receiving a free
appropriate education under the IDEA and defined a free appropriate
education as "an opportunity to achieve [a student's] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children."8 5
Because the court found that there was a disparity between the
student's abilities and her performance, it determined that she was
not receiving a free appropriate education.8 6 On appeal, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
7
holding.8
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the IDEA did not
require the school to provide an interpreter.8 8 The Court began its
analysis with an interpretation of the term "free appropriate public
education."8 9 By examining the language and the legislative history of
the IDEA, the Court concluded that the FAPE requirement is satisfied
when a school system "provide[s] personalized instruction with

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

458 U.S. 176.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 188-89.
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sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally
from that instruction."90
The Court proceeded to determine the proper role of lower
courts in adjudicating placement cases under the IDEA, concluding.
that there is a two-part inquiry that lower courts should apply. 91 First,
courts should ask whether "the State complied with the procedures set
forth in the Act."92 Second, the court should ask if the IEP developed
according to the IDEA is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." 9 The Court pointed out that it was
important for courts examining decisions of school systems to give
"due weight" to the school system's determination in order to avoid
imposing "their view of preferable educational methods upon the
States." 94 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the IDEA did not
require an interpreter for the hearing-impaired student in Rowley. 95
The IDEA has two conflicting mandates: to give every specialneeds student a free appropriate education that is 'tailored to her
individual educational goals and to mainstream special-needs
students to the greatest extent possible. 96 The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the FAPE requirement is not meant to ensure that
all students achieve their "maximum potential." 97 Instead, according
to the Court, the FAPE requirement mandates only that a specialneeds student be given personal instruction and support services
98
sufficient to allow the student to benefit educationally.
These statutory and jurisprudential principles are the only
guidance courts have been given regarding placement decisions under
the IDEA. This lack of guidance has consequently left the lower
federal courts to determine their own methods of properly balancing
the conflicting goals of the IDEA. Currently, courts of appeals are split
on this issue.
B. Circuit Courts
The minimal guidance of the Court's decision in Rowley
resulted in different methods of balancing the competing tensions of

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 203.
at 206-07.
at 206.
at 207.

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 210.
See 20 U.S.C..§ 1412(a)(1)(A), (a)(5) (2000).
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982).

98. Id. at 203.
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the FAPE and LRE requirements. There are at least four different
views on the correct way for courts to balance these mandates. The
Sixth Circuit was the first to address the problem in the 1983 case of
Roncker v. Walter.99 The Fifth Circuit later announced its own test in
0 Finally,
the 1989 case of Daniel R. R. v. State Board of Education.1°
the Ninth Circuit developed a different test in its 1994 decision in
Sacramento City Unified School District v. Holland.10 1 In addition to
these three main tests, courts of appeal sometimes employ a
deferential approach. 102 In order to better understand the choices the
district court faced in the Beth B. case when reviewing Beth's
placement decision under the IDEA, this Note will next discuss the
four different approaches separately.
1. The Roncker Test
The Roncker case was the first inwhich a court of appeals had
to decide how to balance the FAPE requirement with the LRE
requirement. The case concerned a mentally disabled nine-year-old
student named Neill. 0 3 After Neill's IEP, the school system placed
him in a setting where he would only have contact with other mentally
handicapped children.' 0 4 His parents disagreed with this placement
decision and sought an impartial hearing. 0 5 After losing that hearing,
Neill's parents appealed the decision to the state education agency. 0 6
They eventually brought suit in federal district court when the State
10 7
Board of Education also ruled against them.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis by addressing
the Rowley decision. 0 8 The court stated that the first prong of the
Rowley test, "whether the state has complied with the Act's procedural
requirements," had clearly "been satisfied in [the] case."'1 9 The court
then moved to the second prong of the Rowley test and asked whether
the IEP was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

99. 700 F.2d 1058, 1059-64 (6th Cir. 1983).
100. 874 F.2d 1036, 1043-52 (5th Cir. 1989).
101. 14 F.3d 1398, 1403-05 (9th Cir. 1994).
102. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060. Neill Roncker, the plaintiffs son, was classified as
'"Trainable Mentally Retarded," which meant that he had an IQ below 50. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1061.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1062.
109. Id.
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educational benefits."" 0 The court also acknowledged that the IDEA
"does not require mainstreaming in every case" but only requires it "to
the maximum extent appropriate." '
With that foundation established, the court determined that the
proper test in placement cases involves an initial determination of the
factors which make the segregated environment superior to the
nonsegregated environment." 2 Then, the reviewing court should
determine if it is possible to provide those factors in a nonsegregated
setting. 1 3 The court went on to explain that there are three scenarios
in which mentally disabled children could not be educated in a
nonsegregated environment." 4 These situations occur when the
special-needs student would not benefit from mainstreaming, when
the benefits that could be provided in a segregated environment far
outweigh the "marginal benefit[s] from mainstreaming," and when the
handicapped student might disrupt other students. 1 5 However, since
these three situations are arguably'dicta and not part of the Roncker
test, it is unclear whether reviewing courts should consider themselves bound by the Sixth Circuit's position on these three scenarios.
The court added that cost was "a proper factor to consider" but was not
a defense if the school has failed to offer a "proper continuum of
' 6
alternative placements."
The Roncker test was a significant first step in attempting to
reconcile the FAPE provision of the IDEA with the LRE provision.
However, to some, the Roncker test appears intrusive and inconsistent
with the statute." 7 An additional criticism leveled against the decision
is that the test arguably "transformed the inclusion requirement 'from
a negative one-do not segregate unnecessarily-to a positive oneprovide all the services that render segregation unnecessary.' ,,118 In
spite of this criticism, the Roncker test was adopted by both the

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (1982)).
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Daniel R. R., 874 F.2d at 1046 (refusing to adopt the Roncker test because it
"necessitate[d] too intrusive an inquiry [and] ...ma[de] little reference to the language of the
[Act]").
118. Dupre, supra note 39, at 798 (quoting Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the
Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 349, 391 (1990)).
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Eighth Circuit in A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District,11 9 and the
20
Fourth Circuit in DeVries v. FairfaxCounty-School Board.'
2. The Daniel R. R. Test
The next approach to the resolution of the LRE-FAPE tension
came in 1989 with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Daniel R. R. v. State
Board of Education.121 The plaintiff in the Daniel R. R. case was a sixyear-old boy suffering from Down's syndrome. 122 Daniel had been
placed in a prekindergarten class for half of the school day and in an
early childhood program devoted to special education for the other half
of the school day. 23 Daniel's prekindergarten teacher soon discovered
that Daniel was not benefitting from his participation in the
prekindergarten class and proposed at his IEP meeting that he only
attend the special education class.124, Subsequently, Daniel was
removed from the prekindergarten class. 125 Daniel's parents disagreed
with the placement decision and sought an impartial due process
hearing under the IDEA, which they lost. 26 The parents then sought
review of the adverse decision by filing an action in federal district
27
court. 1
The Fifth Circuit considered the Roncker test while examining
Daniel's claim but ultimately rejected that test. 128 The court found two
main flaws in the Roncker test. First, the Roncker test "necessitate[d]
too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy choices that
Congress deliberately left to state and local school officials."'129 The
Fifth Circuit held that whether services can feasibly be provided in a
regular or special education classroom is a determination best made

119. 813 F.2d 158, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1986). The A.W case concerned A.W., an elementary
school-aged child with Down's syndrome. Id. at 160. After noting "strong congressional
preference for mainstreaming," the court accepted the Roncker test because the Roncker court
"correctly interpreted the Act's mainstreaming provisions." Id. at 162-63.
120. 882 F.2d 876, 878-80 (4th Cir. 1989). The special-needs student in DeVries was "a
seventeen-year-old autistic student" who had been placed in a vocational center instead of the
public high school that was closer to his home. Id. at 877. The court adopted the Roncker
methodology and quoted extensively from the case. Id. at 878-79.
121. 874 F.2d 1036.
122. Id. at 1039.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1039-40.
127. Id. at 1040.
128. Id. at 1046.
129. Id.
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by local'school systems and not by courts of law. 130 The second flaw
with the Roncker test, according to the court in Daniel R. R., is that it
does not follow the language of the IDEA closely enough. 13 ' The court
found that the Roncker test was unwarranted, since the statute itself
provided a "workable test for determining whether a state has
'1 32
complied with the Act's mainstreaming requirement."
Focusing on the statutory language, the Fifth- Circuit created
its own two-part test.1 33 First, the court asked "whether education in
the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services,
can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child."134 The court
emphasized that the inquiry under the first part of its new test "is an
individualized, fact-specific" one "that requires [careful examination
of] the nature and severity of the child's handicapping condition, his
1 35
needs and abilities, and the schools' response to the child's needs.'
The court listed four factors, which, while not official steps in
the test, nevertheless "assist the first stage of [the] inquiry."' 36 The
first of these factors was "whether the state has taken steps to
accommodate the handicapped child in regular education.' 1 37 Next, the
court considered the educational benefit, if any, the handicapped child
would receive from education in the' regular classroom. 138 The "child's
overall educational experience in the mainstreamed environment" was
also examined. 3 9 Finally, the court found it necessary to look at the
effect of the mainstreaming on the "regular classroom environment
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1048.
134. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Fifth Circuit opined that the school system was clearly violating the Act if no
steps had been taken to accommodate the disabled. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that even if
steps had been taken to mainstream the student, the court must still determine if those steps
were adequate. Id. The court also noted that "[a]lthough broad, the requirement is not
limitless ... [and school systems] need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or
service." Id. Note that this is a less stringent requirement than in Roncker, where the Sixth
Circuit's test implies that any and all services that can be transported to the regular classroom
have to be transported to enable the mainstreaming of the disabled child. Roncker v. Walter, 700
F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that "where the segregated facility is considered
superior" the court must decide "whether the services which make that placement superior could
be feasibly provided in a nonsegregated setting. If they can, the placement in a segregated school
would be inappropriate under the Act").
138. Daniel R. R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
139. Id. The court suggested that this factor meant that sometimes other positive aspects of
the regular classroom, such as the language models of nondisabled students, might outweigh the
fact that the disabled student is "absorb[ing] only a minimal amount" of the material in- the
regular classroom. Id.
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and, thus, on the education that the other students are receiving." 140
These four factors are the criteria that determine whether a child can
receive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom, and
consequently whether a mainstreaming decision will pass muster
under the first stage of the Daniel R. R. test. However, it is unclear
how much weight is actually accorded to the factors and whether all
four must be met to satisfy the firstz stage of the test. Therefore,
although the language of the first step of the Daniel R. R. test seems
straightforward, its actual application is less clear.
After reviewing the situation in light of the four factors
discussed above, if the court believes that a disabled child's education
cannot be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom, the court
will then ask whether the school has mainstreamed the special-needs
student "to the maximum extent appropriate. 14 1 In this second stage
of the Daniel R. R. test, a reviewing court must look at whether the
school system has attempted- to place the disabled student in contact
with her nondisabled peers as much as possible given the child's
individual situation. 42 Applying this new test, the court found that
Daniel could not be successfully educated in the regular classroom and
that the school system had taken steps to provide "access to
nonhandicapped students."' 43 The court therefore upheld the school
system's placement decision.144
The Daniel R. R. approach improves upon the Roncker test.
Although on its face the Daniel R. R. decision rejected the Roncker
test,' 45 its first prong is in many ways identical to the Roncker test,
because both are concerned with whether special-needs students can
be educated in the regular classroom with assistance. The
improvement made by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R. R. is the addition
of the four factors. Although their exact role in the application of the
test is somewhat unclear, their inclusion is an improvement over the
Roncker test's vagueness with regard to which factors should inform
the application of that test. 4 6 Especially significant is the court's
inclusion of the effects on the regular classroom environment in
140. Id.

141. Id. at 1048 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2000)).
142. Id. at 1050. The court emphasized that the "mix will vary from child to child and...
from school year to school year." Id. The court also described several possibilities for appropriate
mixes under the second stage of their test, such as including the disabled child in the regular
classroom for some classes, but not others, including them in nonacademic classes only, and
providing interaction with nondisabled students during lunch and recess. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1052.
145. Id. at 1048.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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determining whether the education of the disabled student is being
achieved satisfactorily. The other factors also reflect the court's view
that the mainstreaming of a disabled child is not always practical.
Although the Roncker court noted that the IDEA does not always
require mainstreaming, 147 the test the Sixth Circuit devised does not
seem to agree with that contention. 148 The Daniel R. R. test, however,
gives substance to those words by including the four factors as part of
the analysis.
The Daniel R. R. decision has been quite influential. Since the
case was decided, no court of appeals has adopted the Roncker test.
The Daniel R. R. test, on the other hand, has been adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit in Greer v. Rome City School District, 49 and by the
150
Third Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education.
3. The Holland Test
The most recent method of dealing with the LRE-FAPE conflict
was developed in the Ninth Circuit's 1994 Sacramento City Unified
School District v. Holland decision. 15' The Holland case dealt with
Rachel, an eleven-year-old
student with moderate
mental
retardation. 52 Rachel was placed part-time in a regular classroom and
part-time in a special education classroom. 153 Because her parents felt
that she would be better served by being in the regular classroom fulltime, they requested an impartial due process hearing. 54 In contrast
to the Roncker and Daniel R. R. cases, the due process hearing
resulted in a victory for the parents and the school district was
ordered to place Rachel in a regular classroom full-time. 155 In this

147. 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
148. Dupre, supra note 40, at 798.
149. 950 F.2d 688, 696-99 (11th Cir. 1991). The case concerned a ten-year-old girl with
Down's syndrome. Id. at 690. Applying the Daniel R. R. test, the court determined that the
school system had failed the first stage because it did not consider "alternative methods for
educating" the disabled student. Id. at 699.
150. 995 F.2d 1204, 1220-24 (3d Cir. 1993). Oberti dealt with an eight-year-old student with
Down's syndrome. Id. at 1206. The court upheld the district court's ruling and found for the
parents, again because of the school system's failure to pass the first stage of the Daniel R. R.
analysis. Id. at 1222-23. Some commentators see the Oberti decision as a subtle extension of the
Daniel R. R. analysis because it applied the test "even more stringently" than the court did in
DanielR. R.. Melvin, supra note 16, at 634.
151. 14 F.3d 1398, 1403-05 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. Id. at 1400.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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case, the school system appealed the decision to the district court
pursuant to the IDEA. 156
The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged the other tests that had
been devised in this area, 157 but rather than adopting any of those
tests, the court adopted the district court's "four-factor balancing
test."158 In developing this test, the district court and the Ninth
Circuit drew upon factors from both the Roncker and Daniel R. R.
cases. 15 9 The test is comprised of four factors that a reviewing court
must examine in order to strike a balance between an appropriate
education and the mainstreaming requirement. 160 The first factor to
consider is "the educational benefits of placement full-time in a
regular class." 161 The court must also look at the "non-academic
benefits of such placement,... the effect [the disabled student has] on
the teacher and children in the regular class, and ... the costs of
mainstreaming" the disabled student.1 62 The Ninth Circuit accepted
this multifactor balancing test because it "directly addresse[d] the
issue of the appropriate placement" under the IDEA.163 After
describing its new test, the Holland court did not discuss how the test
applied in that particular case.1 64 Instead, the court quickly dismissed
the school system's objections to full-time regular classroom placement
for Rachel and affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the
165
parents.
The Holland decision was a deviation from the earlier modes of
analysis. The Ninth Circuit rejected the more formalistic tests set
forth in Roncker and Daniel R. R. in favor of a more realist balancing
approach. Arguably, a balancing test is more subjective and less likely
to be applied uniformly by the various courts ruling on this issue.
However, this lack of uniformity is in many ways consistent with the
IDEA's underlying purpose because the IDEA and its provisions are
meant, at least in part, to force educational decisions regarding

156. Id.
157. Id. at 1403-04.

158. Id. at 1404.
159. Beth B. v. Van Clay, No. 00-C-4771, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
10, 2001) (noting that the Ninth Circuit's approach "includes elements drawn from both Roncker
and DanielR.R.").
160. Holland, 14 F.3d at 1404.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1403-05.
165. Id. at 1405.
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disabled children to be made on an individual basis. 166 The Ninth
Circuit's balancing test is consistent with this notion because it allows
courts to examine many factors in making an individualized decision
without being constrained by the strictures of a more formalistic test.
One can see the above tests as an evolution from the narrow
Roncker test to the more open test used by the court in Holland. The
Roncker test dominated the period between 1982 and 1989167-it was a

formalistic test that gave judges less leeway than did later tests. Then,
the Daniel R. R. test controlled from 1989 until 1993-it was a
somewhat more open test because it required judges to consider
certain general factors. 168 Finally, in 1994, the Holland case employed
a new and very open test. The progression was linear: As soon as a
new test developed, the courts that were free to adopt the new
approach did so and rejected the older approach. 169 Throughout this
progression, the trend was to increase the amount of freedom given to
judges in making these decisions. This increased discretion has
ensured that more interests are taken into account when making
IDEA placement decisions and also has ensured that the decision is
based on the individual needs of the child and is in his best
170
educational interests.
4. The Deferential Approach' 7'
One final method for dealing with the IDEA's conflicting
provisions has been applied by many different circuits, including
circuits that have created or adopted one of the clear tests discussed
above. This approach is characterized by describing the placement
decision "as a question of methodology" and as long as "the placement
decision is incidental to a decision of educational methodology or

166. See Crockett, supra note 57, at 550 (describing the "revolutionary part" of the Act as
"the shift from substantive to procedural policy," which meant that the educational system was
"making the [placement] decision individually, not by classes or groups of individuals").
167. The dates correspond to the decisions in the Roncker case (1982) and the Deuries case
(1989), the latter of which was the last court of appeals case to adopt the Roncker methodology.
168. These dates relate to the decisions in the Daniel R. R. case (1989) and the Oberti case
(1993); the Oberti case was the last court of appeals case to adopt the Daniel R. R. analysis. See
supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
169. After Daniel R. R. was' decided, circuit courts discontinued the use of the Roncker
approach. Since Holland, no court of appeals has adopted the analysis applied in either Roncker
or DanielR. R.
170. See Crockett, supra note 57, at 550.
171. Melvin, supra note 16, at 639. The name for this method was borrowed from Daniel
Melvin, who developed the concept. Much of the discussion in this section is based on Melvin's
article.
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policy," it will be upheld based on Rowley. 172 The support from the
Rowley case comes from the Supreme Court's statement that
"questions of methodology are for resolution by the States. 17 3
The deferential approach gives the school system freedom to
place the disabled student anywhere it wishes, so long as its decision
can be described as a methodological one, since under Rowley,
methodological decisions are for the states. While laudable as a
preservation of states' rights, this approach may permit courts to
shirk their duties and let school systems avoid the strictures of the
IDEA. Further, the support for this approach seems weak when the
language from Rowley is examined closely. Rowley holds that courts
must first ensure that the provisions of the IDEA have been satisfied
and then leave questions of methodology to the states.1 74 By being
overly deferential, courts thus ignore the first mandate of Rowley: to
ensure enforcement of the IDEA. and its various provisions. Although
the deferential approach is the least legitimate -approach to the
problem because of its end run around the IDEA and its weak support,
it must be considered as a viable alternative, because courts have
often employed this method.
IV. AFFECTED GROUPS
The district court that adjudicated Beth B. v. Van Clay was free
to decide which test to apply because the Seventh Circuit had not
clearly aligned itself with any of the then-existing tests. 175 Ultimately,
the court concluded that "the Daniel R. R. test [was] superior" because
"it tracks the statutory language more closely than... Roncker
176
and... strikes a better balance between the competing policies."
Confronted with the uncertainty in the Seventh Circuit regarding the
correct placement test, the court analyzed the case under the Roncker
model as well.' 77 Under both forms of analysis, the court found for the

172. Id. at 640; see, e.g., Wilson v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (9th
Cir. 1984).
173. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982).
174. 458 U.S. at 208 (concluding that "once a court determines that the requirements of the
Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States").
175. No. 00-C-4771, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094, at *21-22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001).
176. Id. at *23.
,177. Id. at *24. This uncertainty shows that the tensions between the FAPE and LRE
provisions need to be resolved so that reviewing courts and all other affected parties can be
confident of the manner in which placement decisions are reviewed.
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school system and affirmed the decision regarding Beth's
17 8
placement.
The court then had to determine the differences between the
tests and which one was preferable. In Beth B., the court treated the
tests similarly, because the courts in both Roncker and Daniel R. R.
had applied them in a similar manner.179 The resulting obfuscation is
problematic, since the different tests have significant consequences for
various groups in the placement decisionmaking process, including
school systems, classroom educators, nondisabled students, courts,
and disabled students. These differences lead to the conclusion that
the Holland test is the best approach for all parties involved in the
process.
Before analyzing the impact of the tests on the affected parties,
it is necessary to make one important remark. In the following
discussion, this Note does not impute a bad-faith motive on the part of
any of these groups. When the Note discusses the factors that are
important to these groups, it does not mean to suggest that the
different groups are only concerned about that factor. Rather, the Note
assumes that the primary motivating goal for each of these groups is
the best possible education for the disabled student. That said, each of
the groups will approach the problem from its own perspective and the
factors that may be important to one group may be of no concern to
another group.
A. School Systems
Clearly one of the most affected parties in the mainstreaming
decisionmaking process is the local school system. School systems are
motivated by many different factors, but arguablythe primary concern
for a school system in the mainstreaming process is the financial
impact of a potential IEP decision. Funding woes chronically plague
school systems, and the costs of supplementary services for a

178. Id. at *33, *35. The district court's decision was upheld by the Seventh Circuit in Beth
B., 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002). Interestingly, the court explicitly refused to "adopt a formal test
for district courts uniformly to apply when deciding LRE cases," because it felt that "the Act
itself provides enough of a framework." Id. at 499. The court made clear that it felt Rowley had
nothing to say about the LRE analysis and that the existence of "some educational benefit" to the
disabled child would not be enough to require mainstreaming under the Act. Id. at 497-99.
Reflecting a merger of the LRE and FAPE analysis, the court praised the decision of the hearing
officer because he examined whether the placement was the "least restrictive appropriate
environment." Id. at 497.
179. Beth B., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094 at *24 (stating that "[b]ecause the Seventh
Circuit has not adopted either test ... [it would] evaluate Beth's situation under Roncker as
well").
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mainstreamed, disabled child can be a heavy burden.180 The problem
of cost is further complicated by the fact that, although the IDEA
commits the federal government to provide forty percent of the funds
required to be expended under the Act, 18 ' in reality, the government
provides a much lower percentage. 8 2
This lack of resources leaves school systems heavily influenced
by cost when determining an appropriate education and the least
restrictive environment under the IDEA. In a school system's ideal
world, the best test would clearly be the deferential approach, because
the school system would be virtually assured that its cost-conscious
decision would be upheld. 8 3 Even though the deferential approach is
84
based on describing the placement decision as one of methodology,
school systems would easily be able to clothe a decision based on cost
in the language of a methodological decision.
Realistically, the first three approaches are the only practical
alternatives. Of those three, the Holland test is the most attractive to
the interests of local school systems because it is the only one that
considers cost as the primary factor. The Roncker court stated that
cost could be considered when applying its two-part test, but the court
made clear that cost is "no defense" to a school system's failure to
provide a range of placement options. 8 5 It is clear that the Sixth
'8 6
Circuit felt that cost could only be considered in "a limited fashion.'
Moreover, the Daniel R. R. court also did not leave room for any real
consideration of cost. 8 7 To be fair, though, the court explicitly stated

that it was not considering whether cost could be a relevant factor
because the parties did not raise the issue. 88 Even so, the court's test
does not appear to allow cost considerations. In deciding the first
prong of its test, the court looked to four factors, 8 9 but none of the
factors clearly addressed the cost of mainstreaming a child. 190 One
180. Some research suggests that the cost of educating a disabled child is close to two-andone-half times more than the cost of educating a nondisabled child. Collins & Zirkel, supra note
46, at 11.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (2000). The maximum amount of federal funding is determined by
multiplying the number of disabled students by "[forty] percent of the average per-pupil
expenditure... in the United States." § 1411(a)(2).
182. One 1992 article reported that the federal government was only providing nine percent
of funding. Collins & Zirkel, supranote 46, at 11.
183. See supra Part II.B.3.
184. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
185. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
186. Daniel R. R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1039, 1049 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989).
187. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
188. DanielR. R., 874 F.2d at 1049 n.9.
189. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
190. See Daniel R. R., 874 F.2d at 1048-50.

1650

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1627

might argue that an examination of the "effect [of] the ... child's
presence" in the regular. classroom includes cost, but the court's
language is far from clear. 191 In any event, the four factors are only
intended "to assist the first stage of [the Daniel R. R.] inquiry,"
making it unclear how much weight courts could give to any one of the
192
factors even assumingthat cost could be included.
Overall, the best test for the school systems is the Holland test.
Most significantly, the Holland formulation expressly includes cost as
one of the factors a court must weigh. 93 Although the Holland court
held that the school system had not properly conducted the cost
analysis in the case before it, the court did not suggest that the school
system could not use the cost issue as a justification for its placement
decision. 94 Indeed, by chastising the school system for its cost
calculation errors, the court showed that it was willing to consider cost
as a defense as long as it was calculated properly.
B. Classroom Teachers
Another group that is clearly affected by the different
approaches of the courts of appeals is classroom teachers. For
classroom teachers, there are two major issues that cause concern
regarding the mainstreaming of a disabled child. The first of these
concerns is the extent to which classroom teachers will have to modify
their instructional methods and curriculum to meet the needs of the
mainstreamed student in their classroom. 195 A second concern is the
increased time and attention that teachers may be forced to spend on
96
the mainstreamed student.
As with the school system, the classroom teacher's preferred
method might well be the deferential approach because it would give
the most latitude to schools when making the placement decision.' 97
However, as mentioned above, this approach seems impractical
because it could gut the IDEA of any substantive effect by allowing
school systems to do as they please. 198 The Roncker test also seems to
be a weak test for protecting the interests of teachers. The Sixth
191. Id. at 1049.
192. Id. at 1048.
193. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1994).
194. Id. at 1401-02.
195. Dupre, supra note 39, at 850 (noting that one important concern is "the extent to which
the teacher must modify the curriculum that is being taught to the rest of the class to
accommodate the disabled student").
196. Id. at 848.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 183-90.
198. See supra Part II.B.4.
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Circuit notes that a child may not be suitable for mainstreaming
because she may be "a disruptive force in the nonsegregated setting,"
but the court does not elaborate on that issue. 199 Further, the
language is dicta, and technically not a part of the court's test. 200 The
Daniel R. R. court slightly improves upon the Roncker test by
including "the effect the ... child's presence has" on the classroom as a
20 1
guiding factor in the first part of its test.
Again, however, the Holland court does the best job of
reflecting the concerns of the teachers. The Ninth Circuit test clearly
includes "the effect [the disabled child] has on the teacher" as a main
factor. 20 2 The Daniel R. R. court only uses the teacher-effect factor as a
general guide to inform the first stage of its two-part test, while the
Holland court uses the teacher-effect factor as one of the four main
aspects of its test. The Holland court thus clarifies the issue and
makes this aspect more central to a reviewing court's analysis.
C. Nondisabled Students
An issue that is closely related to the effect on teachers is the
effect that the mainstreamed child will have on the nondisabled
children in the classroom. For nondisabled children, the best test may
not be the deferential test because that approach may allow the school
system to put its institutional interests over those of the nondisabled
children. 20 3 The analysis for this group is similar to the analysis for
schoolteachers. 20 4 The Roncker court mentions the fact that
mainstreamed students could possibly be a "disruptive force," without
any further explanation. Furthermore, it is not, actually a part of the
court's test.20 5 The Daniel R. R. court, on the other hand, includes the
effect "on the education that the other students are receiving" as a
factor in the first stage of its test. 20 6 As discussed above, however, the

199. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
200. Id.
201. Daniel R. R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1039, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
202. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
203. This analysis could work the opposite way, though. The important point is that the
deferential approach allows school systems to trump virtually all competing interests, whether
those of disabled or nondisabled students.
204. See supra Part III.B.
205. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
206. 874 F.2d at 1049. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the Fifth Circuit felt
that looking at the effect on students was a logical part of examining the disabled student's effect
on the regular classroom. Id. The court stated that the factor to be considered was the "effect the
handicapped child's presence has on the regular classroom environment and, thus, on the
education that the other students are receiving." Id. In the discussion regarding teachers, only
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exact weight accorded to this factor in the Daniel R. R. test is not
clear. 20 7 Certainly, it is less than the, weight allotted to it by the
Holland court. As with teachers, the Holland court makes the
disabled child's effect on the nondisabled students a major part of its
analysis. 20 8 Again, although both the Daniel R. R. approach and the
Holland approach allow the court to consider the effect of the disabled
child on the nondisabled students, the Holland court makes the issue
more central to its analysis and therefore best represents the interests
of nondisabled students.
D. The Court System
Though the court system may not have an obvious interest in
the mainstreaming debate, it, is critical to consider the needs of the
courts. The central concern for courts when choosing among possible
approaches should be ensuring that they make the correct choice
according to the law. In the realm of the IDEA, the correct decision
according to. the law must be based on an effort to reconcile the
conflicting goals of the statute with the individual needs of the
disabled student.
The question for courts is which of the approaches ensures that
they are able to make the best and most individualized
mainstreaming decision in the cases they decide. Again, it seems that
the Holland approach is superior. The deferential approach would in
many ways be the easiest for courts to apply because it would replace
their job of strenuous review with mere rubber-stamping. In addition
to the argument that the deferential approach too readily allows
school systems to circumvent the provisions of the IDEA, it would
make courts superfluous and would undermine their authority by
allowing school systems to do as they please regardless of the IDEA's
legal mandate.
Again, the realistic choices appear to be the three major tests.
It is significant that the Roncker and Daniel R. R. approaches are each
more formal than the Holland approach. The presence of certain
constraining steps through which courts must progress to make their
decisions characterize both of the formal approaches. In the Daniel
R. R. approach, the court sets forth criteria to consider when applying
the first part of the passage was quoted because it was more applicable to that discussion, but
the court viewed them as one in the same. See id. at 1048-52.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16, 146.
208. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)
(adopting the district court's test and stating that one of the factors to be analyzed is "the effect

[the disabled student] had on the teacher and children in the regular class").
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the test,209 thereby freeing the court to a certain extent. The approach

is more constraining on .reviewing courts than the four-factor
balancing test in Holland, however. 210 The Roncker approach is even
more constraining and is without any indication of what factors should
211
be part of a reviewing court's analysis.
To be sure, courts sometimes abuse balancing tests. Balancing
tests can allow a court to make a ruling based on its personal
judgment rather than legal principles. However, in the context of the
IDEA, a court's job is made easier by a more realistic balancing test
such as the Holland test. The Holland approach gives the court more
freedom to uphold the spirit of the IDEA by making individualized
mainstreaming decisions.
E. DisabledStudents
Clearly the most important group impacted by the selection of
one approach over another is disabled children. The question of which
interest is most significant to disabled children is a matter of debate.
While some have taken the view that the most important goal for
disabled children is full inclusion, 21 2 others have strongly criticized
valuing inclusion of disabled students over ensuring educational
213
benefits for them.
If the argument favoring total inclusion is accepted, the
Roncker test may be the best approach for disabled children. Recall
that the Roncker test only asks whether the services that make the
segregated environment superior can be transported to the regular
classroom. 214 This language creates a presumption in favor of
inclusion and would therefore be acceptable to those favoring total
inclusion.
On the other hand, if the most important goal for disabled
children is purely educational benefit, then the best test would be the
Daniel R. R. or the Holland analysis because of those decisions' more
neutral stance on integration. Again, the Holland test appears
superior for two reasons. First, the test explicitly addresses both
209.
210.
211.
212.

874 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
See 14 F.3d at 1404.
700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., Ann M. Hocutt et al., Historicaland Legal Context of Mainstreaming, in THE

REGULAR EDUCATION INITIATIVE:

ALTERNATIVE

PERSPECTIVES ON CONCEPTS, ISSUES,

AND

MODELS 17 (John Wills Lloyd et al. eds., 1991) (arguing that the current segregated system "has
created a dual educational system which is dysfunctional, ineffective, and excessively costly").
213. See, e.g., Dupre, supra note 39, at 795 (arguing that the courts have "elevat[ed] ...
'appropriate' integration over 'appropriate' education").
214. 700 F.2d at 1063.
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"educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class," 215
representing those who question total inclusion, and "non-academic
benefits '216 of regular class placement, representing the advocates of
total inclusion. The Daniel R. R. court also attempts to resolve this
tension by including an examination of the "child's overall educational
experience... balancing the benefits of regular and special education"
as well as an examination of "whether the child will receive an
educational benefit from regular education." 217 However, the Daniel
R. R. test is inferior to the Holland test because it subordinates the
interests of the disabled child to other interests. The Holland test, on
the other hand, makes both academic and nonacademic benefits to the
disabled child fully half of its test, while in the Daniel R. R. test, the
same benefits comprise only one half of the first step. Even then, it is
unclear exactly how influential they should be in the first step of the
Daniel R. R. analysis.
The second reason that the Holland test is better for disabled
students is that the freedom of the balancing test allows courts to
make more individualized placement decisions. The realist Holland
balancing approach gives courts more discretion to maneuver than the
more formal tests of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
V. CONCLUSION

The IDEA is a well-intentioned statute. It attempts to ensure
that the educational needs of disabled students are met in a manner
that gives them an appropriate education while at the same time
ensuring that they are included in the regular school environment to
the greatest extent possible. The Act is far from clear, however, on
how to resolve conflicts between appropriate education and education
in the least restrictive environment. With statutory ambiguity and the
relative silence from the Supreme Court on this issue, courts have
attempted to reconcile the conflicting provisions in a variety of ways.
At this point in the life of the IDEA, action must be taken to resolve
the conflict between the FAPE and LRE provisions.
One option is for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on an
IDEA placement case and resolve this issue. All parties affected by the
mainstreaming decisionmaking process deserve to know the manner
in which their decision will be reviewed. This outcome will, in turn,
affect how placement decisions are made in the first place.

215. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
216. Id.
217. Daniel R. R. v. Bd. Of Educ., 874 F.2d 1039, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
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If and when the Supreme Court reviews a placement case, it
should adopt the Ninth Circuit approach. from the Holland decision.
The Ninth Circuit's test has two main advantages over the
alternatives. First, the test gives reviewing courts latitude to shape
the best result for disabled students based on their individual needs,
as the IDEA envisions. The Holland test's second strong point is that
it clearly represents the major interests of all of the affected parties.
First, cost is included as a factor, which is a central concern of school
systems. Additionally, the effect on both nondisabled students and
classroom teachers is considered. Since the Ninth Circuit approach is
more flexible, it helps courts to review placement decisions made
under the Act in a more productive manner. Finally, the test clearly
takes the needs of disabled students into account by examining the
academic and nonacademic benefits of regular classroom education.
Even though a Supreme Court decision could resolve this
conflict, the best solution to the problem ultimately lies with Congress.
The root of the conflict is that the IDEA is unclear on how to balance
the FAPE and LRE provisions Congress should .intervene and clearly
establish guidelines on how to balance these provisions. A
congressional resolution would be superior to a judicial one because
Congress, a representative body, could better balance the
countervailing interests in a way that would best serve disabled
students, while taking into account the needs of school systems,
teachers, nondisabled students, and the courts. Until Congress acts,
however, courts can best resolve the tension in the IDEA by adopting
and applying the Ninth Circuit's four-factor balancing test developed
in the Holland case.:
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